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 ᑨ睴诲 睸 睺睺Ơ″Reliability Modeling of a 1-Out-Of-2 System: Research with Diverse Off-The-Shelf SQL Database Servers   Peter Bishop1, 2, Ilir Gashi1, Bev Littlewood1 and David Wright1 1Centre for Software Reliability, City University,                 2Adelard LLP                                         orthampton Square                                   orthampton Square                                         London, EC1V 0HB                                     London, EC1V 0HB E-mail: pgb@adelard.com, i.gashi@city.ac.uk, {bl, d.r.wright}@csr.city.ac.uk    Abstract  Fault tolerance via design diversity is often the only viable way of achieving sufficient dependability levels when using off-the-shelf components. We have reported previously on studies with bug reports of four open-source and commercial off-the-shelf database servers and later release of two of them. The results were very promising for designers of fault-tolerant solutions that wish to employ diverse servers: very few bugs caused failures in more than one server and none caused failure in more than two. In this paper we offer 
details of two approaches we have studied to construct 
reliability growth models for a 1-out-of-2 fault-tolerant 
server which utilize the bug reports. The models 
presented are of practical significance to system 
designers wishing to employ diversity with off-the-shelf 
components since often the bug reports are the only 
direct dependability evidence available to them.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
Off-the-shelf (OTS) components are used 
ubiquitously in software systems development due to 
the perceived lower costs from their use (some of the 
components may be open-source and/or freely 
available), faster deployment and the multitude of 
available options. There remain concerns, however, 
about the dependability levels of the components: they 
tend to be distributed without any assurances of their 
dependability, with “use-as-is” labels often attached to 
them by the vendors. As a result, the only viable way 
available to users and system integrators of achieving 
higher dependability is to use software fault tolerance. 
Fault tolerance may take multiple forms, with examples 
ranging from simple error detection and recovery add-
ons (e.g. “wrappers” [1]) to “diverse modular 
redundancy” (e.g. “N-version programming”: 
replication with diverse versions of components) [2].  
The design decisions are well known from the 
literature. But, questions remain about the 
dependability gains that developers of systems using 
OTS components can expect, the implementation 
difficulties and the extra cost expected. We have 
studied some of these issues with OTS database servers 
or database management system (DBMS) products: a 
complex category of OTS products. The architectural 
solutions for implementing a fault-tolerant DBMS 
using diverse OTS database products are given in [3].  
With regard to the dependability of a fault tolerant 
DBMS, we have reported previously on a study with 
the publicly available fault reports of four OTS DBMS 
products (both open-source and closed development) 
[4] and later releases of two of them [3]. We found that 
a high number of these faults would not be tolerated (or 
even detected) by the existing non-diverse fault-
tolerant schemes but did not cause failures in any two 
diverse DBMS products. We found the number of 
faults that caused coincident failures to be very low. 
These results seem to suggest that significant 
dependability gains may be achieved if diverse modular 
redundancy is employed with OTS DBMS products. 
However they are not definitive evidence. The main 
problem is that the available reports concern faults 
(bugs) and not how many failures each caused, which 
makes their use in reliability predictions difficult.  
Complete failure logs would be much more useful as 
statistical evidence, but they are not available. The only 
direct dependability evidence available for these 
products often are the fault reports. 
It is the absence of failure data and the lack of 
known approaches that can utilize existing fault reports 
of OTS components in reliability assessment that has 
motivated the research detailed in this paper. More 
precisely, the question we attempt to answer is “how 
 ᑨ 睴诲 睸 睺睺Ơ4″can we incorporate existing evidence for off-the-shelf products to evaluate the possible gains in reliability achievable by a 1-out-of-2 diverse server?” To this end we have studied two approaches which use fault reports for obtaining dependability measures of a fault tolerant server employing two diverse OTS DBMS products For the sake of brevity, we shall refer to this fault tolerant DBMS as a “FT-node”.  The two approaches presented in this paper for estimating the reliability of a FT-node are: 1. An extension of a previous software reliability growth model [5] for use in reliability growth modeling of the FT-node.  2. An alternative “proportions” approach where the observed reliability of a single server is scaled by a factor to derive the expected reliability of the FT-node. The first method requires information on actual usage time. In closed development environments, it should be feasible to derive usage time from dated fault reports if the total population of the DBMS product is known over time (e.g. from product registration). However for open source products, information on the product population over time is hard to obtain, and hence the usage time is difficult to estimate. We have therefore developed a second method where information about usage time is not required and statements about the reliability improvement achievable by an FT-node can be made (under certain 
assumptions about the underlying failure rate 
distributions), based only on information derived from 
reported product faults. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 
contains background on the studies we have conducted 
with known fault reports of the DBMS products, 
software reliability growth modeling and the 
Littlewood [5] model; section 3 details the extensions 
of the Littlewood model [5] for the reliability growth 
modeling of the FT-node; section 4 contains details of 
an alternative model in which fault counts alone are 
used for reliability prediction of the FT-node; in the 
same section we also provide empirical data to 
illustrate the use of the method; section 5 contains a 
discussion and verifications of the main modeling 
assumptions made and finally section 6 contains a 
discussions of the two modeling approaches, 
conclusions and provisions for further work. 
 
2. Background and related work 
 
2.1 Analysis of faults in OTS DBMS products 
 
We have conducted two studies with fault reports of 
four OTS DBMS products and later releases of two of 
them. We have fully described these studies and 
provided analysis of the results in [4] and [3]. We will 
be utilizing the results of those studies in this paper as 
empirical evidence with one of the models, as well as 
for verification of assumptions. Therefore, in what 
follows we will provide a brief summary of the studies 
and the main results. 
A mixture of free open-source and commercial 
closed development products were used in the studies. 
In the first study we collected a total of 181 bugs 
reported for the following DBMS products, of which 
the first two are open-source and the last two are 
commercial closed-development products (for the sake 
of brevity, we will use the abbreviations detailed in 
brackets next to each product when referring to these 
products from this point forward):  
- Interbase 6.0 (IB) 
- PostgreSQL 7.0 (PG7.0) 
- Oracle 8.0.5 (OR) 
- Microsoft SQL Server 7 (MS). 
We first ran the bug scripts (contained within the 
bug reports) on the products for which they were 
reported and then (when possible
1
) on the other 
products. We found very few bugs that caused 
coincident failures in more than one DBMS product, 
and none which caused failure in more than two.  
The results were encouraging, but they only 
represented one snapshot in the evolution of these 
products. Therefore we repeated the study for the later 
releases of the two open-source products (due to 
difficulties with data collection no new bug reports 
were collected for the commercial products): 
- Firebird 1.0 (FB) (this is the open-source 
descendant of Interbase 6.0) 
- PostgreSQL 7.2 (PG7.2) 
We collected 92 new bugs reported for these two 
products. The results of the second study substantially 
confirmed those of the first: very few bug reports 
caused coincident failures. This suggests that factors 
that make diversity useful do not disappear as the 
DBMS products evolve and is a further indication that 
diversity with OTS products certainly deserves further 
study. 
 
2.2 Software reliability growth modeling 
 
Software reliability growth modeling is a well 
studied subject over the previous thirty years. A good 
reference to the subject is [6]. Chapter three of [6] 
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 Even though all of these DBMS products are compliant 
with the SQL language, each of them also implement their 
own proprietary extensions. Therefore some faults could be 
run on only one (or a subset of the four) DBMS products. 
provides a comprehensive survey of the well known 
models. In what follows we will provide details of one 
of these models which has been extended in this paper.  
 
2.3 Littlewood model 
 
In what follows we will use the notation and 
assumptions first described in the Littlewood model 
[5]. In [5] (and in reliability growth modeling in 
general), interest centers upon time-to-failure 
distributions and the data is a sequence of successive 
execution times between the failures t1, t2, … ti. The 
following assumptions are made: 
1. Each of the  (the number of faults that exist in the 
OTS software product at its release) faults will 
cause a failure after a time which is distributed 
exponentially, and independently of other faults, 
with rate Φi, 
where Φ1, …, Φ  are independent identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables, 
2. When a failure occurs, there is an instantaneous 
removal of the fault which caused the failure, 
3. If a total time τ has elapsed and i faults have been 
removed and Φ1, … , Φ-i are the failure rates of the 
remaining (latent) faults,  then the failure rate of the 
program is the sum of the rates of these remaining 
faults (the indices will require renumbering)   Λ = Φ1 
+ … + Φ-i 
4. When debugging starts each Φi has the probability 
density function (pdf) b Γ (bφ; a), the Gamma 
Distribution with parameters
2
 a and b, with φ being 
the realization of the random variable Φi. 
Following on from these assumptions it is shown in 
[5] that the times, Ti, at which the faults show 
themselves are i.i.d. random variables and they are 
Pareto distributed: 
 P(Ti < t) = 
a
tb
b
)(1
+
−  (1) 
The motivation behind these assumption and the full 
details of the model can be found in [5]. 
 
3. Extending the Littlewood model 
 
In this section we discuss how the Littlewood model 
can be extended for reliability growth modeling of a 1-
out-of-2 FT-node (i.e. the FT-node is assumed to fail 
only if both of its components fail on a particular 
demand). 
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 We defined the parameters of the gamma Distributions as a 
(shape) and b (scale) instead of the conventional α and β 
since we will define β for a different purpose in section 4.  
The assumptions described in section 2.3 are 
retained, but some additional assumptions are 
necessary to make the analysis tractable. We assume 
that:  
1. The operational profiles (averaged over all users) of 
the two different DBMS products are the same. 
2. There are three different fault totals 
ABBABA  ,,  of faults initially present in the 
software that cause failure in A-only, B-only or 
both A and B. The times to discovery of these faults 
will still be assumed to be conditionally 
exponentially distributed random variables given 
the failure rate distribution, but the failure rate may 
be different for each fault. 
3. Failure due to a specific fault is reported once only, 
for each product version in which it occurs. 
4. The failure rate distributions for each of the 
ABBABA ΦΦΦ ,, (for the three different types of 
failures that the faults cause) are assumed to be 
drawn from the same gamma distribution (we will 
discuss this assumption in more detail in section 5). 
Based on these assumptions, an extended 
Likelihood function of the Littlewood model has been 
derived (see Appendix A). This model makes use of the 
observed failure times of a given type in products A 
and/or B. 
Clearly to apply the model, it is necessary to have 
data on the inter-failure times. If the DBMS suppliers 
maintain detailed information about the calendar time 
when the fault was reported (this is usually available) 
and data on the number of installed versions over time, 
then calendar time can be scaled to derive the total 
product usage time between failures. 
Knowledge of the installed base is only usually 
known to “closed source” DBMS product vendors 
where each instance of the software is licensed. Such 
data is not usually publicly available, but in principle 
inter-failure times can be estimated.  
Quantifying the usage time for open-source OTS 
software products is more difficult. A possible proxy 
for the installed base is the number of downloads [7], 
however there are many uncertainties including: 
- Multiple download sites and/or mirrors exist for 
each product 
- OTS products are often distributed as part of 
operating systems 
- Downloaded products may not actually be used. 
Due to these difficulties, we have not yet obtained the 
data needed to apply the extended Littlewood model 
(although it may be feasible in the future, especially for 
closed source products). 
  
4. The proportions approach 
 
In this section we will explain a different approach 
which attempts to get away from the need to quantify 
actual usage time between failures. This alternative 
approach is useful in applications where it may be 
difficult to quantify the usage time, and hence difficult 
to use the model described in Section 3.  
The alternative approach to modeling the reliability 
of a 1-out-of-2 FT node is to use: 
- the counts of faults which are available from the 
fault logs of each product. From it we can then 
calculate the proportion of faults in product A that 
are also found to cause failure in product B, βAB, 
(from the ratio of common to non-common faults in 
the fault history of A). Similarly we can also 
calculate βBA for product B faults that are also found 
to cause failure in A. 
- the pfd (probability of failure on demand) of the 
products A and/or B;  estimates of these may exist 
for a particular application based on actual failures 
in operation for that application 
This approach has the following underlying 
assumptions: 
- Common faults are drawn from the same failure rate 
distribution as non common faults, i.e. a constant 
proportion of faults in each failure rate band are 
common to A and B. 
- The failure rate distributions for A and B are the 
same. 
These assumptions are identical to those made for 
the extension to the Littlewood model described in 
section 3. Given these assumptions, we can estimate the 
expected common mode failure rate as: 
E(λAB) =  βAB E(λA) or 
E(λBA) =  βBA E(λB) 
Where E(λAB) and E(λBA) both represent common 
mode failure rate estimates that should be, in principle, 
equivalent. In what follows we will describe in more 
detail how these two expressions were obtained. 
 
4.1. The underlying theory of the proportions 
approach 
 
Fault density, h(φ), represents the number of faults 
within a given failure rate interval that remain in a 
component. So, component fault-count and failure rate 
are given by ∫
∞
=
0
)( φφ dh  and ∫
∞
=
0
)( φφφλ dh  
respectively. 
We assume the fault density functions of the A, B 
and AB fault classes are: 
h(φ)Α = ΝΑ p(φ) (2) 
h(φ)Β = ΝΒ p(φ) (3) 
h(φ)ΑΒ = ΝΑΒ p(φ) (4) 
where: 
ΝΑ is the total number of faults in Product A 
ΝΒ is the total number of faults in Product B 
ΝΑΒ are faults common to Products A and B 
p(φ) is the probability distribution3 of failure rate φ 
for a fault in the product (assumed to be the same for 
A, B and AB faults).  
Note that A and B here are the total number of 
faults in each product (i.e. ABBAA  +=  and 
ABBAB  += ) 
Under these assumptions, the expected number of 
those faults nA,τΑ observed in product A during usage 
until time τΑ is: 
E(nA,τΑ  ) = ΝΑ (1 − ∫
∞
−
0
)( φφ φτ dep A )  (5) 
The expected value of the number of faults nAB,τΑ  
observed in product A during usage until time τΑ that 
are also common to product B is: 
E(nAB, τΑ) = ΝΑΒ (1 − ∫
∞
−
0
)( φφ φτ dep A )  (6) 
It can be seen that the assumption of a common 
failure rate distribution means that the bracketed term 
(the probability a fault is found after time τΑ) is 
identical for E(nA) and E(nAB) and will cancel out if we 
take the ratios. So knowledge of the actual usage time 
τΑ and the failure rate distribution p(λ) is not required. 
So we can estimate βΑΒ from the fault sequence 
observed in product A up to τΑ, where some faults in 
the sequence are labeled as being common to B (from a 
knowledge of the B product faults). Given the observed 
values, nA,τΑ and nAB,τΑ: 
βΑΒ = ΝΑΒ /ΝΑ ∼  nAB,τΑ / nA,τΑ (7) 
Similarly, we can also estimate βΒΑ from the fault 
sequence observed in product B up to τΒ 
βΒΑ = ΝΑΒ /ΝΒ ∼  nBA,τΒ / nB,τΒ (8) 
These β values need not necessarily be identical as 
one product could contain more faults than another. 
If we now consider the use of a product for a 
particular application, the operational profile is likely 
to differ from the average usage profile for the product 
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 We use λ for the failure rate of an entire program (i.e. 
Product A, Product B or FT-node AB failure rate), and we 
use φ for the failure rate of a randomly chosen fault.  
which determines the average failure rate distribution 
p(φ). For a different usage profile there will be a new 
failure rate distribution p(φ)′. However if common 
faults are randomly chosen from the set of available 
faults, there is no reason to believe that the proportion 
of common faults will change for any given failure rate 
φ), i.e. we assume that: 
h(φ)′Α = ΝΑ p(φ)′ (9) 
h(φ)′ΑΒ = ΝΑΒ p(φ)′ (10) 
So the expected failure rates are: 
E(λΑ) = ΝΑ ∫
∞
′
0
)( φφφ dp                                      (11) 
E(λΑΒ) = ΝΑβ ∫
∞
′
0
)( φφφ dp                                   (12) 
and hence: 
E(λΑΒ) = βΑΒ Ε(λ A) (13) 
and similarly: 
E(λ ΒΑ) = βΒΑ Ε(λ B) (14) 
The estimates of the performance of each DBMS 
product, E(λA) and E(λB) are derived from testing or 
standalone operation for the actual application, and the 
β values are estimated from the bug history. 
In practice, the estimates E(λΑΒ) and E(λΒΑ) are 
likely to differ due to uncertainties in the β and 
λ values and, in this case, the most conservative 
estimate should be used. 
 
4.2 Empirical derivation of β 
 
In this section we will use the results of our previous 
studies with the bugs [4], [3] (which we summarized in 
section 2.1) to derive empirical estimates of β. The 
results of the first study from running the DBMS 
product faults that could be run on each pair and the 
failures that they cause are given in Table 1: 
- nA are faults reported in product A 
- nAB are product A reported faults that also affect B 
- nB are faults reported in product B 
- nBA are product B reported faults that also affect A. 
The results presented in Table 1 do not distinguish 
between “Bohrbugs” and “Heisenbugs”
4
, i.e. we 
assume the fault will always cause a failure in the 
DBMS product for which it was reported (but not, 
unless it does cause a failure, for other products) even 
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 Terms introduced by Gray [8], defining two types of bugs: 
“Bohrbugs” appear to be deterministic (the failures they 
cause are easy to reproduce in testing); “Heisenbugs”, are 
difficult to reproduce as they only cause failures under 
special conditions: "strange hardware conditions (rare or 
transient device fault), limit conditions (out of storage, 
counter overflow, lost interrupt, etc.) or race conditions" 
if when we tested it in our setup we did not observe the 
failure that was detailed in the bug report. The β values 
obtained for this dataset are given in Table 2. The table 
also contains 90% upper confidence bounds on the 
estimates. The confidence bound is computed using: 
Pr(β < p |n,x) = ∑ r=0,x..C(n,r)pr(1-p)n-r (15) 
where x is the number of common faults in a sequence 
of n faults.  
Table 1 – The results of running the faults on 
each DBMS product pair. First DBMS product 
in the pair is labeled A and the second one B. 
Pair:    
          Failure in: 
nA nAB nB nBA 
IB-PG7.0 28 1 24 0 
IB-OR 31 0 4 0 
IB-MS 35 2 12 1 
PG7.0-OR 30 0 4 1 
PG7.0-MS 33 2 18 6 
OR-MS 4 0 12 0 
Table 2 – Estimates of β for each DBMS 
product pair 
Pair βΑΒ 90% 
bound  
βΒΑ 90% 
bound 
IB-PG7.0 0.036 0.132 0 0.092 
IB-OR 0 0.072 0 0.436 
IB-MS 0.057 0.145 0.083 0.288 
PG7.0-OR 0 0.074 0.250 0.679 
PG7.0-MS 0.061 0.153 0.333 0.511 
OR-MS 0 0.436 0 0.175 
Note that the number of faults for a product (like 
IB) is not constant for different partners (like PG7.0 
and MS) as it only includes the subset of faults that can 
be run on the product pair. 
The β values vary considerably for the different 
product pairs but the number of common faults is low 
(and sometimes zero) so the estimation errors are large. 
From equations (7) and (8), it can be seen that the βΒΑ, 
βΑΒ values need not be identical as they depend on the 
number of residual faults, NA and NB, which can vary 
with the quality of the development process. However 
many of the βΒΑ, βΑΒ values for the DBMS product 
pairs seem to be similar given the inherent sampling 
errors. The main exceptions to this observation are the 
PG7.0-MS and PG7.0-OR DBMS product pairs where 
the βΒΑ value exceeds the 90% confidence bound 
estimate for the βΑΒ value. The proportions theory 
indicates that this would occur if PG7.0 had 
significantly more residual faults than OR and MS. 
Taking the data set as a whole, the results suggest 
that for most diverse DBMS product pairs, β values of 
0.1 (and possibly lower) are possible. This means that 
using a 1-out-of-2 FT-node may reduce the failure rate 
10 fold or more compared with a single DBMS 
product. 
We also compared β  values for successive versions 
of the same DBMS product pairs using the results from 
our second study [3] (described in section 2.1). These 
can be compared with the faults found in the earlier 
releases. The results are given in Table 3. 
Table 3 - The results for different releases 
Pair:    
          Failure in: 
nA nAB nB  nBA 
IB-PG7.0 28 1 24 0 
FB-PG7.2 30 1 18 1 
The β factor estimates for earlier and later releases 
of the products are given in Table 4. 
Table 4 - β values for different releases 
Pair βΑΒ 90% bound βΒΑ 90% bound 
IB-PG7.0 0.036 0.132 0.000 0.092 
FB-PG7.2 0.033 0.124 0.056 0.200 
The β values seem relatively consistent between 
different releases of the same product pair (around 
0.035). This might indicate that the relative 
improvement can be estimated from previous releases 
of the DBMS product pairs (where more data may be 
available). However it is difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions due to the high uncertainty in the 
estimations.  
 
5. Validity of assumptions 
 
The two underlying assumptions of both the 
approaches that have been discussed in this paper are 
that: the failure rate distributions for A and B are the 
same; the failure rate distribution of AB-faults is also 
the same as those of A and B. The following 
subsections consider whether these assumptions are 
credible, and present some statistical tests of the 
underlying assumptions. 
 
5.1 Similar failure rate distribution 
assumption 
 
There is some justification for believing the 
assumption that the failure rate distributions for the 
DBMS product pairs are the same. The research by 
Adams [9] shows that there is remarkable consistency 
in the failure rate distributions of different operating 
systems from the same supplier. In addition, in 
previous work by one of the authors of this paper [10], 
it was argued that the failure rate distribution is 
determined by the complexity of the program structure 
and the failure rates are likely to have the same (log-
normal) distribution. This theory is consistent with the 
empirical observations in Adams [9].  
5.2 Conservatism of the common failure rate 
assumption 
 
It is also assumed that AB faults have the same 
distribution as the A and B faults. This would be the 
case if the AB faults are not “special” in any way (i.e. 
the AB faults are chosen at random from the set of A 
faults). For the empirical results presented in section 
4.2, the AB faults chosen differed for each DBMS 
product pair. So no faults were observed that were 
common to three products (i.e. there are no “special” 
AB faults that occur very frequently). This gives some 
credence to the idea of random selection (as a bias 
towards selecting the same common faults should make 
triple common faults more likely). 
We also note that an assumption of an identical 
distribution of A and AB failure rates would be 
conservative if there is a higher proportion of AB faults 
at higher failure rates. In this case, the β factor 
calculation based on the higher rate faults would 
overestimate the β value of the remaining faults, and 
hence overestimate the common failure rate using 
equations (13) or (14). 
Some empirical experiments [11] suggest that the β 
factor decreases from a high value down to a “plateau” 
as the higher failure rate faults are excluded from the 
fault set. This might be expected if additional 
coincident failures occur when dissimilar faults occupy 
a large proportion of the input space (and hence are 
more likely to overlap with other faults in the input 
space). If this was generally true for product pairs, the 
assumption of common failure rate distributions for A, 
B and AB faults would be conservative (as the β factor 
would be overestimated for the low failure rate faults 
remaining in the two products). 
 
5.3 Statistical tests of the “constant proportion 
of common faults” assumption 
 
The assumption of constant proportion of common 
faults can be tested using the data taken from the fault 
histories. Basically we would expect the sequence of 
common faults, as execution time accumulates, to be 
scaled to the sequence of all faults, as illustrated in Fig. 
1. 
We have used two methods to check whether the 
steps are consistent with the linearity assumption for 
the fault reports in our studies with the faults: 
- We constructed a u-plot
5
 [12] for the DBMS 
product pair PG7.0-MS on MS faults and checked 
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 U-plots can be used (in our case) to test for deviations of 
the observations from the unit slope. 
whether the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) distance 
value obtained is statistically significant. 
- Divided the sample of fault reports for each DBMS 
product in two equally sized groups and performed 
the following tests to check whether there is a 
difference in the number of common faults 
observed between the two groups: 
- Fisher’s Exact test [13] 
- Binomial proportions test [14] 
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Fig. 1 – Illustration of constant proportions for 
an FT-node AB as execution time accumulates 
 
5.3.1 U-plots. In the earlier work [12] on prediction 
analysis, u-plots were used to check for consistent 
differences between the sequence of functions F^i(ti) 
(the predictions) and ti (the actual values). The 
sequence of numbers ui were calculated as  
ui = F^i(ti) (16) 
Each element of the sequence is P(Ti ≤ ti) (previous 
predictive probability that the failure time will be lower 
than its subsequently observed value).  
With the fault reports we have actual values and not 
predictions (here, the ui represent the relative distance 
along the chronological fault sequence at which the i
th
 
coincident fault is observed). We want to check 
whether the fault reports of DBMS product A which 
were also found to cause a failure in DBMS product B 
are equally likely to occur at any stage in the (ordered) 
history of fault reports for A. If this is the case then the 
step function depicted in the u-plot should not deviate 
significantly from the unit-slope (which is the 
cumulative uniform distribution function), i.e. using the 
hypothesis testing terminology: 
H0:The ui are uniformly distributed random variables   
H1:The ui are not uniformly distributed random variables 
We can produce u-plots for DBMS product pairs in 
which coincident failures were observed. However, as 
we saw in Tables 1 and 3, the number of coincident 
failures observed is very small (≤ 2) for all but one pair 
(the PG7.0-MS pair on MS faults). We will therefore 
show only one of the u-plots: for the pair PG7.0-MS on 
the MS faults. This u-plot is depicted in Fig 2.  
The explanation of the u-plot follows: a total of 18 
fault reports of MS could be run on the PG7.0 DBMS 
product (we’ll call it n); of those 6 caused a coincident 
failure in PG (we’ll call it r). Since there are 6 
coincident failure faults there will be a total of six steps 
in the u-plot function. The size of each step is 1/r. The 
ui values on the x-axis will represent the point i/n, i.e. 
the sequence in which the fault was reported in MS. 
Therefore if the second fault of MS was found to cause 
a coincident failure in PG7.0 this will be shown as the 
point 2/18 (i.e. 1/9) on the x-axis. The KS distance for 
this pair is 0.3889 with the p-value 0.5041. Since the p-
value is so large we do not have enough evidence to 
reject H0 for this DBMS product pair: we do not have 
enough evidence to reject the claim that ui are 
uniformly distributed random variables. Therefore on 
this dataset there is not enough evidence to reject the 
assumption of constant proportion of common faults. 
 
Fig. 2 - The u-plot computed for the coincident 
failure causing faults in PG7.0 and MS by the 
faults reported for MS. 
5.3.2 Tests for equality of proportions. We can also 
verify the assumption of constant proportions of 
coincident failures by partitioning the sample of faults 
observed and checking whether the proportion of 
coincident faults differs significantly between the 
partitions. Initially we have done this by partitioning 
the samples in two.  
To illustrate how this was done, we will again use 
the MS faults that could also be run on the PG7.0 
DBMS product. We have a total of 18 fault reports. We 
split the sample in half chronologically and check 
whether the proportion of MS faults reported earlier 
that cause coincident failures in PG7.0 differs 
significantly from the proportion of later MS faults. We 
therefore have two partitions each with 9 fault reports 
and the common faults found in each half is 1 and 5 
respectively.  
The full details for each pair of DBMS products on 
each dataset are given in Table 5. The table also 
contains the results of performing the Fisher’s Exact 
test and the Binomial proportions test. The Fisher’s 
Exact test used is the one for 2 X 2 tables. Fisher’s 
exact test for 2 X 2 tables is used when members of 
two independent groups can fall into mutually 
exclusive categories. Quoting from [15]: “The test is 
used to determine whether the proportions of those 
falling into each category differ by group.” The 
Binomial Proportions test (the last column of Table 5 
contain the p-values of this test), is only an 
approximation, whereas the Fisher’s exact test 
calculates the exact probability. Note that the problem 
of low sample sizes for coincident faults remains. 
Whenever possible (i.e. when the number of coincident 
failures is not 0) we have also tried to calculate the p-
values, but we warn the readers that, due to the small 
sample sizes, these values should be taken with caution. 
We can see in Table 5 that the p-values for the 
Fisher’s exact test are not statistically significant at the 
5% level. This is due to there being little difference 
between the two partitions, or in the case of PG7.0-MS 
on MS faults, the sample size being too small for the p-
value to be significant. For this latter pair the value is 
statistically significant at the 10% level (on the MS 
faults). For the Binomial Proportions test only the p-
value of PG-MS on MS faults is statistically significant 
at the 5% significance level (the p-value is 0.0455); 
none of the others are significant at the 5% or 10% 
level. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Two approaches to predicting the reliability of a 1-
out-of-2 FT-node were described in sections 3 and 4. 
These methods are based on some strong assumptions 
about the operational profile and failure rate 
distributions which may not hold in real operation. 
Ideally we would like to have detailed information 
about failure counts and usage time. However vendors 
discourage users from reporting already known faults 
and detailed failure data are rarely available even to the 
software vendors themselves. Also due to the various 
non-restrictive license agreements of the open-source 
DBMS products, a DBMS product may be downloaded 
from a multitude of sources and then installed in many 
different instances, which makes estimation of the 
usage time of the DBMS products very difficult. Faced 
with these difficult problems of data availability, it was 
necessary to make these strong modeling assumptions 
in order to make an initial estimate of the potential 
benefits of fault tolerance with SQL DBMS products. 
In section 5.2 we argued that assuming a common 
failure rate distribution for A-, B- and AB-faults is 
conservative. Also we have observed in earlier research 
[4], [3] that AB-faults can fail in different ways in the 
two DBMS products, and hence can be detected (and 
potentially corrected [16]). As a result, the estimates 
that we get using our models for the reliability benefits 
of diversity will most probably be underestimates: the 
true benefits may be higher. Despite this conservatism, 
using the reported faults for the DBMS products in our 
studies, we would expect an order of magnitude 
increase in reliability when switching from a single 
DBMS product to a 1-out-of-2 FT-node. This result 
should however be treated with caution, due to the 
small sample sizes and relatively high estimation 
errors. There also appear to be variations in 
dependability improvement between different DBMS 
product pairs.  
We used the reported faults from our studies to test 
for statistical significance of empirical deviation from 
the “constant proportion of common faults” 
Table 5 - Results from performing the Fisher’s exact and Binomial proportions tests on the 
data sets of the faults study (after the data sets were partitioned into two halves). 
DBMS 
product 
pair 
Faults reported 
for DBMS 
product 
1 AB1 2 AB2 
Fisher’s exact test Binomial Proportions: 
Exact probability p-value p-value 
IB-PG7.0 IB 14 1 14 0 0.5 0.5 0.309 
IB-PG7.0 PG7.0 12 0 12 0 N/A N/A N/A 
IB-OR IB 15 0 16 0 N/A N/A N/A 
IB-OR OR 2 0 2 0 N/A N/A N/A 
IB-MS IB 17 2 18 0 0.2286 0.2286 0.134 
IB-MS MS 6 0 6 1 0.5 0.5 0.296 
PG7.0-OR PG7.0 15 0 15 0 N/A N/A N/A 
PG7.0-OR OR 2 1 2 0 0.5 0.5 0.248 
PG7.0-MS PG7.0 16 1 17 1 0.5152 0.7728 0.965 
PG7.0-MS MS 9 1 9 5 0.0611 0.0656 0.0455 
MS-OR MS 6 0 6 0 N/A N/A N/A 
MS-OR OR 2 0 2 0 N/A N/A N/A 
assumption, using u-plots and two tests for difference 
between proportions (namely Fisher’s exact and the 
Binomial Proportions tests). We found that these tests 
are giving reasonably consistent results with regard to 
whether the hypothesis of constant proportion of 
common faults should be rejected. Using these tests at 
the 90% confidence level, we found, at most, one case 
out of 12 where the null hypothesis was rejected (and 
typically 1 in 10 cases might be rejected at the 90% 
confidence level when the hypothesis is true). This 
would indicate that the assumption of constant 
proportions is reasonable for the dataset we used but 
further work is required to draw more general 
conclusions due to the small sample size in the dataset. 
In summary, for users who want to assess the likely 
dependability gains achievable if they switch from 
using a single DBMS product to a 1-out-of-2 diverse 
server then: 
- if the only dependability data available for the 
DBMS products are the fault reports, and 
reasonable estimates can be obtained for the failure 
rate of the DBMS product they are using, then the 
model described in section 4 can be used to 
calculate the likely improvements in reliability that 
they may expect from the changeover to a diverse 
setup 
- if proxies can also be obtained for usage time, then 
the extended Littlewood model, described in 
section 3, may also be used to assess the 
improvements as well as obtain other estimates such 
as: 
- the rate distribution of the common faults 
- predictions about the expected time to next 
diverse server failure etc. 
- the two approaches may also be used sequentially to 
improve the predictions: 
- the β values using the proportions approach of 
section 4 are calculated first, and they are then 
used to obtain a b parameter for the prior 
distribution of the extended Littlewood model 
Further research is needed to validate the theory 
presented in this paper. This research includes: 
- Methods for obtaining more accurate proxies for 
usage time.  
- Empirical investigations of the predictive 
performance of the proportions model for actual 
DBMS product pairs. 
- Empirical investigations of the consistency of β  
factor estimates in successive releases of the same 
product pair. 
- Applying the method to other types of off-the-shelf 
components (such as diverse web-servers and 
application servers).  
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Appendix A –Likelihood equations of the 
extended Littlewood model 
 
To produce a general likelihood function for the 
model discussed in section 3, several different kinds of 
data need to be considered. For each reported fault we 
need to consider: 
- whether it is present in both DBMS products (i.e. 
could it have caused a failure in both DBMS 
products),  
- whether it was randomly encountered during 
testing of one or more DBMS products (i.e. has it 
been reported in more than one DBMS product). 
We assume that all three classes of faults (faults that 
are present in DBMS product A only, B only, or both) 
have rates independently selected from one common 
gamma rate distribution. This produces a 5-parameter 
model with parameters being three unknown fault-
count parameters (say ABBABA  ,, ), and two Γ-
distribution parameters a, b. 
For the data symbols, we will use a convention that 
observed failure counts n, and also observed times T of 
random failure are all, likewise, subscripted to denote 
which DBMS product(s) contain the faults, and, in 
addition,  superscripted to identify the DBMS 
product(s) during the testing of which the fault is 
randomly encountered. In the case of Ts only, with 
multiple superscripts (AB or BA), the first of these 
superscripts will indicate which DBMS product’s time 
T is. For all other cases (whether of subscripts or 
superscripts AB) the order has no significance and will 
be left alphabetic. Finally, parameters l
A 
and l
B
 
represent the testing time for DBMS product A or B 
respectively. Using these conventions, the extended 
Likelihood function for the Littlewood model is given 
by: 
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